From 36cb75c51d268f6d527154f328ef9c6f4e004ea4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Foo Bar Date: Sun, 27 Nov 2022 20:32:22 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] [wip] packaging nacl --- jrw/jex.eterms | 5 + libs/tweetnacl/.gitignore | 2 + libs/tweetnacl/README.md | 482 ++++++++++++++ libs/tweetnacl/dist/nacl.d.ts | 98 +++ libs/tweetnacl/dist/nacl.js | 1178 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ libs/tweetnacl/jex.eterms | 5 + libs/tweetnacl/tsconfig.json | 16 + utils/jex/priv/MANUAL.txt | 301 ++------- utils/jex/src/jex.erl | 44 +- 9 files changed, 1874 insertions(+), 257 deletions(-) create mode 100644 jrw/jex.eterms create mode 100644 libs/tweetnacl/.gitignore create mode 100644 libs/tweetnacl/README.md create mode 100644 libs/tweetnacl/dist/nacl.d.ts create mode 100644 libs/tweetnacl/dist/nacl.js create mode 100644 libs/tweetnacl/jex.eterms create mode 100644 libs/tweetnacl/tsconfig.json diff --git a/jrw/jex.eterms b/jrw/jex.eterms new file mode 100644 index 0000000..856c285 --- /dev/null +++ b/jrw/jex.eterms @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +{type, site}. +{realm, local}. +{name, jrw}. +{version, "0.1.0"}. +{deps, ["local-awcp-0.2.0"]}. diff --git a/libs/tweetnacl/.gitignore b/libs/tweetnacl/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 0000000..43dd0cb --- /dev/null +++ b/libs/tweetnacl/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +docs +erl_crash.dump diff --git a/libs/tweetnacl/README.md b/libs/tweetnacl/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ccad188 --- /dev/null +++ b/libs/tweetnacl/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,482 @@ +TweetNaCl.js +============ + +Port of [TweetNaCl](http://tweetnacl.cr.yp.to) / [NaCl](http://nacl.cr.yp.to/) +to JavaScript for modern browsers and Node.js. Public domain. + +[![Build Status](https://travis-ci.org/dchest/tweetnacl-js.svg?branch=master) +](https://travis-ci.org/dchest/tweetnacl-js) + +Demo: + +Documentation +============= + +* [Overview](#overview) +* [Audits](#audits) +* [Installation](#installation) +* [Examples](#examples) +* [Usage](#usage) + * [Public-key authenticated encryption (box)](#public-key-authenticated-encryption-box) + * [Secret-key authenticated encryption (secretbox)](#secret-key-authenticated-encryption-secretbox) + * [Scalar multiplication](#scalar-multiplication) + * [Signatures](#signatures) + * [Hashing](#hashing) + * [Random bytes generation](#random-bytes-generation) + * [Constant-time comparison](#constant-time-comparison) +* [System requirements](#system-requirements) +* [Development and testing](#development-and-testing) +* [Benchmarks](#benchmarks) +* [Contributors](#contributors) +* [Who uses it](#who-uses-it) + + +Overview +-------- + +The primary goal of this project is to produce a translation of TweetNaCl to +JavaScript which is as close as possible to the original C implementation, plus +a thin layer of idiomatic high-level API on top of it. + +There are two versions, you can use either of them: + +* `nacl.js` is the port of TweetNaCl with minimum differences from the + original + high-level API. + +* `nacl-fast.js` is like `nacl.js`, but with some functions replaced with + faster versions. (Used by default when importing NPM package.) + + +Audits +------ + +TweetNaCl.js has been audited by [Cure53](https://cure53.de/) in January-February +2017 (audit was sponsored by [Deletype](https://deletype.com)): + +> The overall outcome of this audit signals a particularly positive assessment +> for TweetNaCl-js, as the testing team was unable to find any security +> problems in the library. + +[Read full audit report](https://cure53.de/tweetnacl.pdf) + +While the audit didn't find any bugs, there has been [1 bug](https://github.com/dchest/tweetnacl-js/issues/187) discovered and fixed after the audit. + + +Installation +------------ + +You can install TweetNaCl.js via a package manager: + +[Yarn](https://yarnpkg.com/): + + $ yarn add tweetnacl + +[NPM](https://www.npmjs.org/): + + $ npm install tweetnacl + +or [download source code](https://github.com/dchest/tweetnacl-js/releases). + + +Examples +-------- +You can find usage examples in our [wiki](https://github.com/dchest/tweetnacl-js/wiki/Examples). + + +Usage +----- + +All API functions accept and return bytes as `Uint8Array`s. If you need to +encode or decode strings, use functions from + or one of the more robust codec +packages. + +In Node.js v4 and later `Buffer` objects are backed by `Uint8Array`s, so you +can freely pass them to TweetNaCl.js functions as arguments. The returned +objects are still `Uint8Array`s, so if you need `Buffer`s, you'll have to +convert them manually; make sure to convert using copying: `Buffer.from(array)` +(or `new Buffer(array)` in Node.js v4 or earlier), instead of sharing: +`Buffer.from(array.buffer)` (or `new Buffer(array.buffer)` Node 4 or earlier), +because some functions return subarrays of their buffers. + + +### Public-key authenticated encryption (box) + +Implements *x25519-xsalsa20-poly1305*. + +#### nacl.box.keyPair() + +Generates a new random key pair for box and returns it as an object with +`publicKey` and `secretKey` members: + + { + publicKey: ..., // Uint8Array with 32-byte public key + secretKey: ... // Uint8Array with 32-byte secret key + } + + +#### nacl.box.keyPair.fromSecretKey(secretKey) + +Returns a key pair for box with public key corresponding to the given secret +key. + +#### nacl.box(message, nonce, theirPublicKey, mySecretKey) + +Encrypts and authenticates message using peer's public key, our secret key, and +the given nonce, which must be unique for each distinct message for a key pair. + +Returns an encrypted and authenticated message, which is +`nacl.box.overheadLength` longer than the original message. + +#### nacl.box.open(box, nonce, theirPublicKey, mySecretKey) + +Authenticates and decrypts the given box with peer's public key, our secret +key, and the given nonce. + +Returns the original message, or `null` if authentication fails. + +#### nacl.box.before(theirPublicKey, mySecretKey) + +Returns a precomputed shared key which can be used in `nacl.box.after` and +`nacl.box.open.after`. + +#### nacl.box.after(message, nonce, sharedKey) + +Same as `nacl.box`, but uses a shared key precomputed with `nacl.box.before`. + +#### nacl.box.open.after(box, nonce, sharedKey) + +Same as `nacl.box.open`, but uses a shared key precomputed with `nacl.box.before`. + +#### Constants + +##### nacl.box.publicKeyLength = 32 + +Length of public key in bytes. + +##### nacl.box.secretKeyLength = 32 + +Length of secret key in bytes. + +##### nacl.box.sharedKeyLength = 32 + +Length of precomputed shared key in bytes. + +##### nacl.box.nonceLength = 24 + +Length of nonce in bytes. + +##### nacl.box.overheadLength = 16 + +Length of overhead added to box compared to original message. + + +### Secret-key authenticated encryption (secretbox) + +Implements *xsalsa20-poly1305*. + +#### nacl.secretbox(message, nonce, key) + +Encrypts and authenticates message using the key and the nonce. The nonce must +be unique for each distinct message for this key. + +Returns an encrypted and authenticated message, which is +`nacl.secretbox.overheadLength` longer than the original message. + +#### nacl.secretbox.open(box, nonce, key) + +Authenticates and decrypts the given secret box using the key and the nonce. + +Returns the original message, or `null` if authentication fails. + +#### Constants + +##### nacl.secretbox.keyLength = 32 + +Length of key in bytes. + +##### nacl.secretbox.nonceLength = 24 + +Length of nonce in bytes. + +##### nacl.secretbox.overheadLength = 16 + +Length of overhead added to secret box compared to original message. + + +### Scalar multiplication + +Implements *x25519*. + +#### nacl.scalarMult(n, p) + +Multiplies an integer `n` by a group element `p` and returns the resulting +group element. + +#### nacl.scalarMult.base(n) + +Multiplies an integer `n` by a standard group element and returns the resulting +group element. + +#### Constants + +##### nacl.scalarMult.scalarLength = 32 + +Length of scalar in bytes. + +##### nacl.scalarMult.groupElementLength = 32 + +Length of group element in bytes. + + +### Signatures + +Implements [ed25519](http://ed25519.cr.yp.to). + +#### nacl.sign.keyPair() + +Generates new random key pair for signing and returns it as an object with +`publicKey` and `secretKey` members: + + { + publicKey: ..., // Uint8Array with 32-byte public key + secretKey: ... // Uint8Array with 64-byte secret key + } + +#### nacl.sign.keyPair.fromSecretKey(secretKey) + +Returns a signing key pair with public key corresponding to the given +64-byte secret key. The secret key must have been generated by +`nacl.sign.keyPair` or `nacl.sign.keyPair.fromSeed`. + +#### nacl.sign.keyPair.fromSeed(seed) + +Returns a new signing key pair generated deterministically from a 32-byte seed. +The seed must contain enough entropy to be secure. This method is not +recommended for general use: instead, use `nacl.sign.keyPair` to generate a new +key pair from a random seed. + +#### nacl.sign(message, secretKey) + +Signs the message using the secret key and returns a signed message. + +#### nacl.sign.open(signedMessage, publicKey) + +Verifies the signed message and returns the message without signature. + +Returns `null` if verification failed. + +#### nacl.sign.detached(message, secretKey) + +Signs the message using the secret key and returns a signature. + +#### nacl.sign.detached.verify(message, signature, publicKey) + +Verifies the signature for the message and returns `true` if verification +succeeded or `false` if it failed. + +#### Constants + +##### nacl.sign.publicKeyLength = 32 + +Length of signing public key in bytes. + +##### nacl.sign.secretKeyLength = 64 + +Length of signing secret key in bytes. + +##### nacl.sign.seedLength = 32 + +Length of seed for `nacl.sign.keyPair.fromSeed` in bytes. + +##### nacl.sign.signatureLength = 64 + +Length of signature in bytes. + + +### Hashing + +Implements *SHA-512*. + +#### nacl.hash(message) + +Returns SHA-512 hash of the message. + +#### Constants + +##### nacl.hash.hashLength = 64 + +Length of hash in bytes. + + +### Random bytes generation + +#### nacl.randomBytes(length) + +Returns a `Uint8Array` of the given length containing random bytes of +cryptographic quality. + +**Implementation note** + +TweetNaCl.js uses the following methods to generate random bytes, +depending on the platform it runs on: + +* `window.crypto.getRandomValues` (WebCrypto standard) +* `window.msCrypto.getRandomValues` (Internet Explorer 11) +* `crypto.randomBytes` (Node.js) + +If the platform doesn't provide a suitable PRNG, the following functions, +which require random numbers, will throw exception: + +* `nacl.randomBytes` +* `nacl.box.keyPair` +* `nacl.sign.keyPair` + +Other functions are deterministic and will continue working. + +If a platform you are targeting doesn't implement secure random number +generator, but you somehow have a cryptographically-strong source of entropy +(not `Math.random`!), and you know what you are doing, you can plug it into +TweetNaCl.js like this: + + nacl.setPRNG(function(x, n) { + // ... copy n random bytes into x ... + }); + +Note that `nacl.setPRNG` *completely replaces* internal random byte generator +with the one provided. + + +### Constant-time comparison + +#### nacl.verify(x, y) + +Compares `x` and `y` in constant time and returns `true` if their lengths are +non-zero and equal, and their contents are equal. + +Returns `false` if either of the arguments has zero length, or arguments have +different lengths, or their contents differ. + + +System requirements +------------------- + +TweetNaCl.js supports modern browsers that have a cryptographically secure +pseudorandom number generator and typed arrays, including the latest versions +of: + +* Chrome +* Firefox +* Safari (Mac, iOS) +* Internet Explorer 11 + +Other systems: + +* Node.js + + +Development and testing +------------------------ + +Install NPM modules needed for development: + + $ npm install + +To build minified versions: + + $ npm run build + +Tests use minified version, so make sure to rebuild it every time you change +`nacl.js` or `nacl-fast.js`. + +### Testing + +To run tests in Node.js: + + $ npm run test-node + +By default all tests described here work on `nacl.min.js`. To test other +versions, set environment variable `NACL_SRC` to the file name you want to test. +For example, the following command will test fast minified version: + + $ NACL_SRC=nacl-fast.min.js npm run test-node + +To run full suite of tests in Node.js, including comparing outputs of +JavaScript port to outputs of the original C version: + + $ npm run test-node-all + +To prepare tests for browsers: + + $ npm run build-test-browser + +and then open `test/browser/test.html` (or `test/browser/test-fast.html`) to +run them. + +To run tests in both Node and Electron: + + $ npm test + +### Benchmarking + +To run benchmarks in Node.js: + + $ npm run bench + $ NACL_SRC=nacl-fast.min.js npm run bench + +To run benchmarks in a browser, open `test/benchmark/bench.html` (or +`test/benchmark/bench-fast.html`). + + +Benchmarks +---------- + +For reference, here are benchmarks from MacBook Pro (Retina, 13-inch, Mid 2014) +laptop with 2.6 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU (Intel) in Chrome 53/OS X, Xiaomi Redmi +Note 3 smartphone with 1.8 GHz Qualcomm Snapdragon 650 64-bit CPU (ARM) in +Chrome 52/Android, and MacBook Air 2020 with Apple M1 SOC (M1) in Chromium 102/macOS. + +| | nacl.js Intel | nacl-fast.js Intel | nacl.js ARM | nacl-fast.js ARM | nacl-fast.js M1 | +| ------------- |:-------------:|:-------------------:|:-------------:|:-----------------:|:-----------------:| +| salsa20 | 1.3 MB/s | 128 MB/s | 0.4 MB/s | 43 MB/s | 268 MB/s | +| poly1305 | 13 MB/s | 171 MB/s | 4 MB/s | 52 MB/s | 248 MB/s | +| hash | 4 MB/s | 34 MB/s | 0.9 MB/s | 12 MB/s | 76 MB/s | +| secretbox 1K | 1113 op/s | 57583 op/s | 334 op/s | 14227 op/s | 54546 op/s | +| box 1K | 145 op/s | 718 op/s | 37 op/s | 368 op/s | 1836 op/s | +| scalarMult | 171 op/s | 733 op/s | 56 op/s | 380 op/s | 1882 op/s | +| sign | 77 op/s | 200 op/s | 20 op/s | 61 op/s | 592 op/s | +| sign.open | 39 op/s | 102 op/s | 11 op/s | 31 op/s | 300 op/s | + +(You can run benchmarks on your devices by clicking on the links at the bottom +of the [home page](https://tweetnacl.js.org)). + +In short, with *nacl-fast.js* and 1024-byte messages you can expect to encrypt and +authenticate more than 57000 messages per second on a typical laptop or more than +14000 messages per second on a $170 smartphone, sign about 500 and verify 300 +messages per second on a laptop or 60 and 30 messages per second on a smartphone, +per CPU core (with Web Workers you can do these operations in parallel), +which is good enough for most applications. + + +Contributors +------------ + +See AUTHORS.md file. + + +Third-party libraries based on TweetNaCl.js +------------------------------------------- + +* [chloride](https://github.com/dominictarr/chloride) - unified API for various NaCl modules +* [forward-secrecy](https://github.com/alax/forward-secrecy) — Axolotl ratchet implementation +* [nacl-stream](https://github.com/dchest/nacl-stream-js) - streaming encryption +* [ristretto255-js](https://github.com/calibra/ristretto255-js) — implementation of the [ristretto255 group](https://ristretto.group/) +* [tweetnacl-auth-js](https://github.com/dchest/tweetnacl-auth-js) — implementation of [`crypto_auth`](http://nacl.cr.yp.to/auth.html) +* [tweetnacl-js-sealed-box](https://github.com/TogaTech/tweetnacl-js-sealed-box) — fork that adds [`sealed boxes`](https://download.libsodium.org/doc/public-key_cryptography/sealed_boxes.html) +* [ed2curve](https://github.com/dchest/ed2curve-js) — convert Ed25519 signing key pair to X25519 boxes key pair + + +Who uses it +----------- + +Some notable users of TweetNaCl.js are listed on the [associated wiki page](https://github.com/dchest/tweetnacl-js/wiki/Who-uses-TweetNaCl.js). diff --git a/libs/tweetnacl/dist/nacl.d.ts b/libs/tweetnacl/dist/nacl.d.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..78c4f78 --- /dev/null +++ b/libs/tweetnacl/dist/nacl.d.ts @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +// Type definitions for TweetNaCl.js + +export as namespace nacl; + +declare var nacl: nacl; +export = nacl; + +declare namespace nacl { + export interface BoxKeyPair { + publicKey: Uint8Array; + secretKey: Uint8Array; + } + + export interface SignKeyPair { + publicKey: Uint8Array; + secretKey: Uint8Array; + } + + export interface secretbox { + (msg: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array, key: Uint8Array): Uint8Array; + open(box: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array, key: Uint8Array): Uint8Array | null; + readonly keyLength: number; + readonly nonceLength: number; + readonly overheadLength: number; + } + + export interface scalarMult { + (n: Uint8Array, p: Uint8Array): Uint8Array; + base(n: Uint8Array): Uint8Array; + readonly scalarLength: number; + readonly groupElementLength: number; + } + + namespace boxProps { + export interface open { + (msg: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array, publicKey: Uint8Array, secretKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array | null; + after(box: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array, key: Uint8Array): Uint8Array | null; + } + + export interface keyPair { + (): BoxKeyPair; + fromSecretKey(secretKey: Uint8Array): BoxKeyPair; + } + } + + export interface box { + (msg: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array, publicKey: Uint8Array, secretKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array; + before(publicKey: Uint8Array, secretKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array; + after(msg: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array, key: Uint8Array): Uint8Array; + open: boxProps.open; + keyPair: boxProps.keyPair; + readonly publicKeyLength: number; + readonly secretKeyLength: number; + readonly sharedKeyLength: number; + readonly nonceLength: number; + readonly overheadLength: number; + } + + namespace signProps { + export interface detached { + (msg: Uint8Array, secretKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array; + verify(msg: Uint8Array, sig: Uint8Array, publicKey: Uint8Array): boolean; + } + + export interface keyPair { + (): SignKeyPair; + fromSecretKey(secretKey: Uint8Array): SignKeyPair; + fromSeed(secretKey: Uint8Array): SignKeyPair; + } + } + + export interface sign { + (msg: Uint8Array, secretKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array; + open(signedMsg: Uint8Array, publicKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array | null; + detached: signProps.detached; + keyPair: signProps.keyPair; + readonly publicKeyLength: number; + readonly secretKeyLength: number; + readonly seedLength: number; + readonly signatureLength: number; + } + + export interface hash { + (msg: Uint8Array): Uint8Array; + readonly hashLength: number; + } +} + +declare interface nacl { + randomBytes(n: number): Uint8Array; + secretbox: nacl.secretbox; + scalarMult: nacl.scalarMult; + box: nacl.box; + sign: nacl.sign; + hash: nacl.hash; + verify(x: Uint8Array, y: Uint8Array): boolean; + setPRNG(fn: (x: Uint8Array, n: number) => void): void; +} diff --git a/libs/tweetnacl/dist/nacl.js b/libs/tweetnacl/dist/nacl.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fd8e678 --- /dev/null +++ b/libs/tweetnacl/dist/nacl.js @@ -0,0 +1,1178 @@ +(function(nacl) { +'use strict'; + +// Ported in 2014 by Dmitry Chestnykh and Devi Mandiri. +// Public domain. +// +// Implementation derived from TweetNaCl version 20140427. +// See for details: http://tweetnacl.cr.yp.to/ + +var u64 = function(h, l) { this.hi = h|0 >>> 0; this.lo = l|0 >>> 0; }; +var gf = function(init) { + var i, r = new Float64Array(16); + if (init) for (i = 0; i < init.length; i++) r[i] = init[i]; + return r; +}; + +// Pluggable, initialized in high-level API below. +var randombytes = function(/* x, n */) { throw new Error('no PRNG'); }; + +var _0 = new Uint8Array(16); +var _9 = new Uint8Array(32); _9[0] = 9; + +var gf0 = gf(), + gf1 = gf([1]), + _121665 = gf([0xdb41, 1]), + D = gf([0x78a3, 0x1359, 0x4dca, 0x75eb, 0xd8ab, 0x4141, 0x0a4d, 0x0070, 0xe898, 0x7779, 0x4079, 0x8cc7, 0xfe73, 0x2b6f, 0x6cee, 0x5203]), + D2 = gf([0xf159, 0x26b2, 0x9b94, 0xebd6, 0xb156, 0x8283, 0x149a, 0x00e0, 0xd130, 0xeef3, 0x80f2, 0x198e, 0xfce7, 0x56df, 0xd9dc, 0x2406]), + X = gf([0xd51a, 0x8f25, 0x2d60, 0xc956, 0xa7b2, 0x9525, 0xc760, 0x692c, 0xdc5c, 0xfdd6, 0xe231, 0xc0a4, 0x53fe, 0xcd6e, 0x36d3, 0x2169]), + Y = gf([0x6658, 0x6666, 0x6666, 0x6666, 0x6666, 0x6666, 0x6666, 0x6666, 0x6666, 0x6666, 0x6666, 0x6666, 0x6666, 0x6666, 0x6666, 0x6666]), + I = gf([0xa0b0, 0x4a0e, 0x1b27, 0xc4ee, 0xe478, 0xad2f, 0x1806, 0x2f43, 0xd7a7, 0x3dfb, 0x0099, 0x2b4d, 0xdf0b, 0x4fc1, 0x2480, 0x2b83]); + +function L32(x, c) { return (x << c) | (x >>> (32 - c)); } + +function ld32(x, i) { + var u = x[i+3] & 0xff; + u = (u<<8)|(x[i+2] & 0xff); + u = (u<<8)|(x[i+1] & 0xff); + return (u<<8)|(x[i+0] & 0xff); +} + +function dl64(x, i) { + var h = (x[i] << 24) | (x[i+1] << 16) | (x[i+2] << 8) | x[i+3]; + var l = (x[i+4] << 24) | (x[i+5] << 16) | (x[i+6] << 8) | x[i+7]; + return new u64(h, l); +} + +function st32(x, j, u) { + var i; + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { x[j+i] = u & 255; u >>>= 8; } +} + +function ts64(x, i, u) { + x[i] = (u.hi >> 24) & 0xff; + x[i+1] = (u.hi >> 16) & 0xff; + x[i+2] = (u.hi >> 8) & 0xff; + x[i+3] = u.hi & 0xff; + x[i+4] = (u.lo >> 24) & 0xff; + x[i+5] = (u.lo >> 16) & 0xff; + x[i+6] = (u.lo >> 8) & 0xff; + x[i+7] = u.lo & 0xff; +} + +function vn(x, xi, y, yi, n) { + var i,d = 0; + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) d |= x[xi+i]^y[yi+i]; + return (1 & ((d - 1) >>> 8)) - 1; +} + +function crypto_verify_16(x, xi, y, yi) { + return vn(x,xi,y,yi,16); +} + +function crypto_verify_32(x, xi, y, yi) { + return vn(x,xi,y,yi,32); +} + +function core(out,inp,k,c,h) { + var w = new Uint32Array(16), x = new Uint32Array(16), + y = new Uint32Array(16), t = new Uint32Array(4); + var i, j, m; + + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + x[5*i] = ld32(c, 4*i); + x[1+i] = ld32(k, 4*i); + x[6+i] = ld32(inp, 4*i); + x[11+i] = ld32(k, 16+4*i); + } + + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) y[i] = x[i]; + + for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { + for (m = 0; m < 4; m++) t[m] = x[(5*j+4*m)%16]; + t[1] ^= L32((t[0]+t[3])|0, 7); + t[2] ^= L32((t[1]+t[0])|0, 9); + t[3] ^= L32((t[2]+t[1])|0,13); + t[0] ^= L32((t[3]+t[2])|0,18); + for (m = 0; m < 4; m++) w[4*j+(j+m)%4] = t[m]; + } + for (m = 0; m < 16; m++) x[m] = w[m]; + } + + if (h) { + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) x[i] = (x[i] + y[i]) | 0; + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + x[5*i] = (x[5*i] - ld32(c, 4*i)) | 0; + x[6+i] = (x[6+i] - ld32(inp, 4*i)) | 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + st32(out,4*i,x[5*i]); + st32(out,16+4*i,x[6+i]); + } + } else { + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) st32(out, 4 * i, (x[i] + y[i]) | 0); + } +} + +function crypto_core_salsa20(out,inp,k,c) { + core(out,inp,k,c,false); + return 0; +} + +function crypto_core_hsalsa20(out,inp,k,c) { + core(out,inp,k,c,true); + return 0; +} + +var sigma = new Uint8Array([101, 120, 112, 97, 110, 100, 32, 51, 50, 45, 98, 121, 116, 101, 32, 107]); + // "expand 32-byte k" + +function crypto_stream_salsa20_xor(c,cpos,m,mpos,b,n,k) { + var z = new Uint8Array(16), x = new Uint8Array(64); + var u, i; + if (!b) return 0; + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) z[i] = 0; + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) z[i] = n[i]; + while (b >= 64) { + crypto_core_salsa20(x,z,k,sigma); + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) c[cpos+i] = (m?m[mpos+i]:0) ^ x[i]; + u = 1; + for (i = 8; i < 16; i++) { + u = u + (z[i] & 0xff) | 0; + z[i] = u & 0xff; + u >>>= 8; + } + b -= 64; + cpos += 64; + if (m) mpos += 64; + } + if (b > 0) { + crypto_core_salsa20(x,z,k,sigma); + for (i = 0; i < b; i++) c[cpos+i] = (m?m[mpos+i]:0) ^ x[i]; + } + return 0; +} + +function crypto_stream_salsa20(c,cpos,d,n,k) { + return crypto_stream_salsa20_xor(c,cpos,null,0,d,n,k); +} + +function crypto_stream(c,cpos,d,n,k) { + var s = new Uint8Array(32); + crypto_core_hsalsa20(s,n,k,sigma); + return crypto_stream_salsa20(c,cpos,d,n.subarray(16),s); +} + +function crypto_stream_xor(c,cpos,m,mpos,d,n,k) { + var s = new Uint8Array(32); + crypto_core_hsalsa20(s,n,k,sigma); + return crypto_stream_salsa20_xor(c,cpos,m,mpos,d,n.subarray(16),s); +} + +function add1305(h, c) { + var j, u = 0; + for (j = 0; j < 17; j++) { + u = (u + ((h[j] + c[j]) | 0)) | 0; + h[j] = u & 255; + u >>>= 8; + } +} + +var minusp = new Uint32Array([ + 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 252 +]); + +function crypto_onetimeauth(out, outpos, m, mpos, n, k) { + var s, i, j, u; + var x = new Uint32Array(17), r = new Uint32Array(17), + h = new Uint32Array(17), c = new Uint32Array(17), + g = new Uint32Array(17); + for (j = 0; j < 17; j++) r[j]=h[j]=0; + for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) r[j]=k[j]; + r[3]&=15; + r[4]&=252; + r[7]&=15; + r[8]&=252; + r[11]&=15; + r[12]&=252; + r[15]&=15; + + while (n > 0) { + for (j = 0; j < 17; j++) c[j] = 0; + for (j = 0; (j < 16) && (j < n); ++j) c[j] = m[mpos+j]; + c[j] = 1; + mpos += j; n -= j; + add1305(h,c); + for (i = 0; i < 17; i++) { + x[i] = 0; + for (j = 0; j < 17; j++) x[i] = (x[i] + (h[j] * ((j <= i) ? r[i - j] : ((320 * r[i + 17 - j])|0))) | 0) | 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < 17; i++) h[i] = x[i]; + u = 0; + for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) { + u = (u + h[j]) | 0; + h[j] = u & 255; + u >>>= 8; + } + u = (u + h[16]) | 0; h[16] = u & 3; + u = (5 * (u >>> 2)) | 0; + for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) { + u = (u + h[j]) | 0; + h[j] = u & 255; + u >>>= 8; + } + u = (u + h[16]) | 0; h[16] = u; + } + + for (j = 0; j < 17; j++) g[j] = h[j]; + add1305(h,minusp); + s = (-(h[16] >>> 7) | 0); + for (j = 0; j < 17; j++) h[j] ^= s & (g[j] ^ h[j]); + + for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) c[j] = k[j + 16]; + c[16] = 0; + add1305(h,c); + for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) out[outpos+j] = h[j]; + return 0; +} + +function crypto_onetimeauth_verify(h, hpos, m, mpos, n, k) { + var x = new Uint8Array(16); + crypto_onetimeauth(x,0,m,mpos,n,k); + return crypto_verify_16(h,hpos,x,0); +} + +function crypto_secretbox(c,m,d,n,k) { + var i; + if (d < 32) return -1; + crypto_stream_xor(c,0,m,0,d,n,k); + crypto_onetimeauth(c, 16, c, 32, d - 32, c); + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) c[i] = 0; + return 0; +} + +function crypto_secretbox_open(m,c,d,n,k) { + var i; + var x = new Uint8Array(32); + if (d < 32) return -1; + crypto_stream(x,0,32,n,k); + if (crypto_onetimeauth_verify(c, 16,c, 32,d - 32,x) !== 0) return -1; + crypto_stream_xor(m,0,c,0,d,n,k); + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) m[i] = 0; + return 0; +} + +function set25519(r, a) { + var i; + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) r[i] = a[i]|0; +} + +function car25519(o) { + var c; + var i; + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + o[i] += 65536; + c = Math.floor(o[i] / 65536); + o[(i+1)*(i<15?1:0)] += c - 1 + 37 * (c-1) * (i===15?1:0); + o[i] -= (c * 65536); + } +} + +function sel25519(p, q, b) { + var t, c = ~(b-1); + for (var i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + t = c & (p[i] ^ q[i]); + p[i] ^= t; + q[i] ^= t; + } +} + +function pack25519(o, n) { + var i, j, b; + var m = gf(), t = gf(); + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) t[i] = n[i]; + car25519(t); + car25519(t); + car25519(t); + for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { + m[0] = t[0] - 0xffed; + for (i = 1; i < 15; i++) { + m[i] = t[i] - 0xffff - ((m[i-1]>>16) & 1); + m[i-1] &= 0xffff; + } + m[15] = t[15] - 0x7fff - ((m[14]>>16) & 1); + b = (m[15]>>16) & 1; + m[14] &= 0xffff; + sel25519(t, m, 1-b); + } + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + o[2*i] = t[i] & 0xff; + o[2*i+1] = t[i]>>8; + } +} + +function neq25519(a, b) { + var c = new Uint8Array(32), d = new Uint8Array(32); + pack25519(c, a); + pack25519(d, b); + return crypto_verify_32(c, 0, d, 0); +} + +function par25519(a) { + var d = new Uint8Array(32); + pack25519(d, a); + return d[0] & 1; +} + +function unpack25519(o, n) { + var i; + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) o[i] = n[2*i] + (n[2*i+1] << 8); + o[15] &= 0x7fff; +} + +function A(o, a, b) { + var i; + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) o[i] = (a[i] + b[i])|0; +} + +function Z(o, a, b) { + var i; + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) o[i] = (a[i] - b[i])|0; +} + +function M(o, a, b) { + var i, j, t = new Float64Array(31); + for (i = 0; i < 31; i++) t[i] = 0; + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) { + t[i+j] += a[i] * b[j]; + } + } + for (i = 0; i < 15; i++) { + t[i] += 38 * t[i+16]; + } + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) o[i] = t[i]; + car25519(o); + car25519(o); +} + +function S(o, a) { + M(o, a, a); +} + +function inv25519(o, i) { + var c = gf(); + var a; + for (a = 0; a < 16; a++) c[a] = i[a]; + for (a = 253; a >= 0; a--) { + S(c, c); + if(a !== 2 && a !== 4) M(c, c, i); + } + for (a = 0; a < 16; a++) o[a] = c[a]; +} + +function pow2523(o, i) { + var c = gf(); + var a; + for (a = 0; a < 16; a++) c[a] = i[a]; + for (a = 250; a >= 0; a--) { + S(c, c); + if(a !== 1) M(c, c, i); + } + for (a = 0; a < 16; a++) o[a] = c[a]; +} + +function crypto_scalarmult(q, n, p) { + var z = new Uint8Array(32); + var x = new Float64Array(80), r, i; + var a = gf(), b = gf(), c = gf(), + d = gf(), e = gf(), f = gf(); + for (i = 0; i < 31; i++) z[i] = n[i]; + z[31]=(n[31]&127)|64; + z[0]&=248; + unpack25519(x,p); + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + b[i]=x[i]; + d[i]=a[i]=c[i]=0; + } + a[0]=d[0]=1; + for (i=254; i>=0; --i) { + r=(z[i>>>3]>>>(i&7))&1; + sel25519(a,b,r); + sel25519(c,d,r); + A(e,a,c); + Z(a,a,c); + A(c,b,d); + Z(b,b,d); + S(d,e); + S(f,a); + M(a,c,a); + M(c,b,e); + A(e,a,c); + Z(a,a,c); + S(b,a); + Z(c,d,f); + M(a,c,_121665); + A(a,a,d); + M(c,c,a); + M(a,d,f); + M(d,b,x); + S(b,e); + sel25519(a,b,r); + sel25519(c,d,r); + } + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + x[i+16]=a[i]; + x[i+32]=c[i]; + x[i+48]=b[i]; + x[i+64]=d[i]; + } + var x32 = x.subarray(32); + var x16 = x.subarray(16); + inv25519(x32,x32); + M(x16,x16,x32); + pack25519(q,x16); + return 0; +} + +function crypto_scalarmult_base(q, n) { + return crypto_scalarmult(q, n, _9); +} + +function crypto_box_keypair(y, x) { + randombytes(x, 32); + return crypto_scalarmult_base(y, x); +} + +function crypto_box_beforenm(k, y, x) { + var s = new Uint8Array(32); + crypto_scalarmult(s, x, y); + return crypto_core_hsalsa20(k, _0, s, sigma); +} + +var crypto_box_afternm = crypto_secretbox; +var crypto_box_open_afternm = crypto_secretbox_open; + +function crypto_box(c, m, d, n, y, x) { + var k = new Uint8Array(32); + crypto_box_beforenm(k, y, x); + return crypto_box_afternm(c, m, d, n, k); +} + +function crypto_box_open(m, c, d, n, y, x) { + var k = new Uint8Array(32); + crypto_box_beforenm(k, y, x); + return crypto_box_open_afternm(m, c, d, n, k); +} + +function add64() { + var a = 0, b = 0, c = 0, d = 0, m16 = 65535, l, h, i; + for (i = 0; i < arguments.length; i++) { + l = arguments[i].lo; + h = arguments[i].hi; + a += (l & m16); b += (l >>> 16); + c += (h & m16); d += (h >>> 16); + } + + b += (a >>> 16); + c += (b >>> 16); + d += (c >>> 16); + + return new u64((c & m16) | (d << 16), (a & m16) | (b << 16)); +} + +function shr64(x, c) { + return new u64((x.hi >>> c), (x.lo >>> c) | (x.hi << (32 - c))); +} + +function xor64() { + var l = 0, h = 0, i; + for (i = 0; i < arguments.length; i++) { + l ^= arguments[i].lo; + h ^= arguments[i].hi; + } + return new u64(h, l); +} + +function R(x, c) { + var h, l, c1 = 32 - c; + if (c < 32) { + h = (x.hi >>> c) | (x.lo << c1); + l = (x.lo >>> c) | (x.hi << c1); + } else if (c < 64) { + h = (x.lo >>> c) | (x.hi << c1); + l = (x.hi >>> c) | (x.lo << c1); + } + return new u64(h, l); +} + +function Ch(x, y, z) { + var h = (x.hi & y.hi) ^ (~x.hi & z.hi), + l = (x.lo & y.lo) ^ (~x.lo & z.lo); + return new u64(h, l); +} + +function Maj(x, y, z) { + var h = (x.hi & y.hi) ^ (x.hi & z.hi) ^ (y.hi & z.hi), + l = (x.lo & y.lo) ^ (x.lo & z.lo) ^ (y.lo & z.lo); + return new u64(h, l); +} + +function Sigma0(x) { return xor64(R(x,28), R(x,34), R(x,39)); } +function Sigma1(x) { return xor64(R(x,14), R(x,18), R(x,41)); } +function sigma0(x) { return xor64(R(x, 1), R(x, 8), shr64(x,7)); } +function sigma1(x) { return xor64(R(x,19), R(x,61), shr64(x,6)); } + +var K = [ + new u64(0x428a2f98, 0xd728ae22), new u64(0x71374491, 0x23ef65cd), + new u64(0xb5c0fbcf, 0xec4d3b2f), new u64(0xe9b5dba5, 0x8189dbbc), + new u64(0x3956c25b, 0xf348b538), new u64(0x59f111f1, 0xb605d019), + new u64(0x923f82a4, 0xaf194f9b), new u64(0xab1c5ed5, 0xda6d8118), + new u64(0xd807aa98, 0xa3030242), new u64(0x12835b01, 0x45706fbe), + new u64(0x243185be, 0x4ee4b28c), new u64(0x550c7dc3, 0xd5ffb4e2), + new u64(0x72be5d74, 0xf27b896f), new u64(0x80deb1fe, 0x3b1696b1), + new u64(0x9bdc06a7, 0x25c71235), new u64(0xc19bf174, 0xcf692694), + new u64(0xe49b69c1, 0x9ef14ad2), new u64(0xefbe4786, 0x384f25e3), + new u64(0x0fc19dc6, 0x8b8cd5b5), new u64(0x240ca1cc, 0x77ac9c65), + new u64(0x2de92c6f, 0x592b0275), new u64(0x4a7484aa, 0x6ea6e483), + new u64(0x5cb0a9dc, 0xbd41fbd4), new u64(0x76f988da, 0x831153b5), + new u64(0x983e5152, 0xee66dfab), new u64(0xa831c66d, 0x2db43210), + new u64(0xb00327c8, 0x98fb213f), new u64(0xbf597fc7, 0xbeef0ee4), + new u64(0xc6e00bf3, 0x3da88fc2), new u64(0xd5a79147, 0x930aa725), + new u64(0x06ca6351, 0xe003826f), new u64(0x14292967, 0x0a0e6e70), + new u64(0x27b70a85, 0x46d22ffc), new u64(0x2e1b2138, 0x5c26c926), + new u64(0x4d2c6dfc, 0x5ac42aed), new u64(0x53380d13, 0x9d95b3df), + new u64(0x650a7354, 0x8baf63de), new u64(0x766a0abb, 0x3c77b2a8), + new u64(0x81c2c92e, 0x47edaee6), new u64(0x92722c85, 0x1482353b), + new u64(0xa2bfe8a1, 0x4cf10364), new u64(0xa81a664b, 0xbc423001), + new u64(0xc24b8b70, 0xd0f89791), new u64(0xc76c51a3, 0x0654be30), + new u64(0xd192e819, 0xd6ef5218), new u64(0xd6990624, 0x5565a910), + new u64(0xf40e3585, 0x5771202a), new u64(0x106aa070, 0x32bbd1b8), + new u64(0x19a4c116, 0xb8d2d0c8), new u64(0x1e376c08, 0x5141ab53), + new u64(0x2748774c, 0xdf8eeb99), new u64(0x34b0bcb5, 0xe19b48a8), + new u64(0x391c0cb3, 0xc5c95a63), new u64(0x4ed8aa4a, 0xe3418acb), + new u64(0x5b9cca4f, 0x7763e373), new u64(0x682e6ff3, 0xd6b2b8a3), + new u64(0x748f82ee, 0x5defb2fc), new u64(0x78a5636f, 0x43172f60), + new u64(0x84c87814, 0xa1f0ab72), new u64(0x8cc70208, 0x1a6439ec), + new u64(0x90befffa, 0x23631e28), new u64(0xa4506ceb, 0xde82bde9), + new u64(0xbef9a3f7, 0xb2c67915), new u64(0xc67178f2, 0xe372532b), + new u64(0xca273ece, 0xea26619c), new u64(0xd186b8c7, 0x21c0c207), + new u64(0xeada7dd6, 0xcde0eb1e), new u64(0xf57d4f7f, 0xee6ed178), + new u64(0x06f067aa, 0x72176fba), new u64(0x0a637dc5, 0xa2c898a6), + new u64(0x113f9804, 0xbef90dae), new u64(0x1b710b35, 0x131c471b), + new u64(0x28db77f5, 0x23047d84), new u64(0x32caab7b, 0x40c72493), + new u64(0x3c9ebe0a, 0x15c9bebc), new u64(0x431d67c4, 0x9c100d4c), + new u64(0x4cc5d4be, 0xcb3e42b6), new u64(0x597f299c, 0xfc657e2a), + new u64(0x5fcb6fab, 0x3ad6faec), new u64(0x6c44198c, 0x4a475817) +]; + +function crypto_hashblocks(x, m, n) { + var z = [], b = [], a = [], w = [], t, i, j; + + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) z[i] = a[i] = dl64(x, 8*i); + + var pos = 0; + while (n >= 128) { + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) w[i] = dl64(m, 8*i+pos); + for (i = 0; i < 80; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) b[j] = a[j]; + t = add64(a[7], Sigma1(a[4]), Ch(a[4], a[5], a[6]), K[i], w[i%16]); + b[7] = add64(t, Sigma0(a[0]), Maj(a[0], a[1], a[2])); + b[3] = add64(b[3], t); + for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) a[(j+1)%8] = b[j]; + if (i%16 === 15) { + for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) { + w[j] = add64(w[j], w[(j+9)%16], sigma0(w[(j+1)%16]), sigma1(w[(j+14)%16])); + } + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + a[i] = add64(a[i], z[i]); + z[i] = a[i]; + } + + pos += 128; + n -= 128; + } + + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) ts64(x, 8*i, z[i]); + return n; +} + +var iv = new Uint8Array([ + 0x6a,0x09,0xe6,0x67,0xf3,0xbc,0xc9,0x08, + 0xbb,0x67,0xae,0x85,0x84,0xca,0xa7,0x3b, + 0x3c,0x6e,0xf3,0x72,0xfe,0x94,0xf8,0x2b, + 0xa5,0x4f,0xf5,0x3a,0x5f,0x1d,0x36,0xf1, + 0x51,0x0e,0x52,0x7f,0xad,0xe6,0x82,0xd1, + 0x9b,0x05,0x68,0x8c,0x2b,0x3e,0x6c,0x1f, + 0x1f,0x83,0xd9,0xab,0xfb,0x41,0xbd,0x6b, + 0x5b,0xe0,0xcd,0x19,0x13,0x7e,0x21,0x79 +]); + +function crypto_hash(out, m, n) { + var h = new Uint8Array(64), x = new Uint8Array(256); + var i, b = n; + + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) h[i] = iv[i]; + + crypto_hashblocks(h, m, n); + n %= 128; + + for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) x[i] = 0; + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) x[i] = m[b-n+i]; + x[n] = 128; + + n = 256-128*(n<112?1:0); + x[n-9] = 0; + ts64(x, n-8, new u64((b / 0x20000000) | 0, b << 3)); + crypto_hashblocks(h, x, n); + + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) out[i] = h[i]; + + return 0; +} + +function add(p, q) { + var a = gf(), b = gf(), c = gf(), + d = gf(), e = gf(), f = gf(), + g = gf(), h = gf(), t = gf(); + + Z(a, p[1], p[0]); + Z(t, q[1], q[0]); + M(a, a, t); + A(b, p[0], p[1]); + A(t, q[0], q[1]); + M(b, b, t); + M(c, p[3], q[3]); + M(c, c, D2); + M(d, p[2], q[2]); + A(d, d, d); + Z(e, b, a); + Z(f, d, c); + A(g, d, c); + A(h, b, a); + + M(p[0], e, f); + M(p[1], h, g); + M(p[2], g, f); + M(p[3], e, h); +} + +function cswap(p, q, b) { + var i; + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + sel25519(p[i], q[i], b); + } +} + +function pack(r, p) { + var tx = gf(), ty = gf(), zi = gf(); + inv25519(zi, p[2]); + M(tx, p[0], zi); + M(ty, p[1], zi); + pack25519(r, ty); + r[31] ^= par25519(tx) << 7; +} + +function scalarmult(p, q, s) { + var b, i; + set25519(p[0], gf0); + set25519(p[1], gf1); + set25519(p[2], gf1); + set25519(p[3], gf0); + for (i = 255; i >= 0; --i) { + b = (s[(i/8)|0] >> (i&7)) & 1; + cswap(p, q, b); + add(q, p); + add(p, p); + cswap(p, q, b); + } +} + +function scalarbase(p, s) { + var q = [gf(), gf(), gf(), gf()]; + set25519(q[0], X); + set25519(q[1], Y); + set25519(q[2], gf1); + M(q[3], X, Y); + scalarmult(p, q, s); +} + +function crypto_sign_keypair(pk, sk, seeded) { + var d = new Uint8Array(64); + var p = [gf(), gf(), gf(), gf()]; + var i; + + if (!seeded) randombytes(sk, 32); + crypto_hash(d, sk, 32); + d[0] &= 248; + d[31] &= 127; + d[31] |= 64; + + scalarbase(p, d); + pack(pk, p); + + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) sk[i+32] = pk[i]; + return 0; +} + +var L = new Float64Array([0xed, 0xd3, 0xf5, 0x5c, 0x1a, 0x63, 0x12, 0x58, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0xa2, 0xde, 0xf9, 0xde, 0x14, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x10]); + +function modL(r, x) { + var carry, i, j, k; + for (i = 63; i >= 32; --i) { + carry = 0; + for (j = i - 32, k = i - 12; j < k; ++j) { + x[j] += carry - 16 * x[i] * L[j - (i - 32)]; + carry = Math.floor((x[j] + 128) / 256); + x[j] -= carry * 256; + } + x[j] += carry; + x[i] = 0; + } + carry = 0; + for (j = 0; j < 32; j++) { + x[j] += carry - (x[31] >> 4) * L[j]; + carry = x[j] >> 8; + x[j] &= 255; + } + for (j = 0; j < 32; j++) x[j] -= carry * L[j]; + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + x[i+1] += x[i] >> 8; + r[i] = x[i] & 255; + } +} + +function reduce(r) { + var x = new Float64Array(64), i; + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) x[i] = r[i]; + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) r[i] = 0; + modL(r, x); +} + +// Note: difference from C - smlen returned, not passed as argument. +function crypto_sign(sm, m, n, sk) { + var d = new Uint8Array(64), h = new Uint8Array(64), r = new Uint8Array(64); + var i, j, x = new Float64Array(64); + var p = [gf(), gf(), gf(), gf()]; + + crypto_hash(d, sk, 32); + d[0] &= 248; + d[31] &= 127; + d[31] |= 64; + + var smlen = n + 64; + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) sm[64 + i] = m[i]; + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) sm[32 + i] = d[32 + i]; + + crypto_hash(r, sm.subarray(32), n+32); + reduce(r); + scalarbase(p, r); + pack(sm, p); + + for (i = 32; i < 64; i++) sm[i] = sk[i]; + crypto_hash(h, sm, n + 64); + reduce(h); + + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) x[i] = 0; + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) x[i] = r[i]; + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < 32; j++) { + x[i+j] += h[i] * d[j]; + } + } + + modL(sm.subarray(32), x); + return smlen; +} + +function unpackneg(r, p) { + var t = gf(), chk = gf(), num = gf(), + den = gf(), den2 = gf(), den4 = gf(), + den6 = gf(); + + set25519(r[2], gf1); + unpack25519(r[1], p); + S(num, r[1]); + M(den, num, D); + Z(num, num, r[2]); + A(den, r[2], den); + + S(den2, den); + S(den4, den2); + M(den6, den4, den2); + M(t, den6, num); + M(t, t, den); + + pow2523(t, t); + M(t, t, num); + M(t, t, den); + M(t, t, den); + M(r[0], t, den); + + S(chk, r[0]); + M(chk, chk, den); + if (neq25519(chk, num)) M(r[0], r[0], I); + + S(chk, r[0]); + M(chk, chk, den); + if (neq25519(chk, num)) return -1; + + if (par25519(r[0]) === (p[31]>>7)) Z(r[0], gf0, r[0]); + + M(r[3], r[0], r[1]); + return 0; +} + +function crypto_sign_open(m, sm, n, pk) { + var i; + var t = new Uint8Array(32), h = new Uint8Array(64); + var p = [gf(), gf(), gf(), gf()], + q = [gf(), gf(), gf(), gf()]; + + if (n < 64) return -1; + + if (unpackneg(q, pk)) return -1; + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) m[i] = sm[i]; + for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) m[i+32] = pk[i]; + crypto_hash(h, m, n); + reduce(h); + scalarmult(p, q, h); + + scalarbase(q, sm.subarray(32)); + add(p, q); + pack(t, p); + + n -= 64; + if (crypto_verify_32(sm, 0, t, 0)) { + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) m[i] = 0; + return -1; + } + + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) m[i] = sm[i + 64]; + return n; +} + +var crypto_secretbox_KEYBYTES = 32, + crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES = 24, + crypto_secretbox_ZEROBYTES = 32, + crypto_secretbox_BOXZEROBYTES = 16, + crypto_scalarmult_BYTES = 32, + crypto_scalarmult_SCALARBYTES = 32, + crypto_box_PUBLICKEYBYTES = 32, + crypto_box_SECRETKEYBYTES = 32, + crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES = 32, + crypto_box_NONCEBYTES = crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES, + crypto_box_ZEROBYTES = crypto_secretbox_ZEROBYTES, + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES = crypto_secretbox_BOXZEROBYTES, + crypto_sign_BYTES = 64, + crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES = 32, + crypto_sign_SECRETKEYBYTES = 64, + crypto_sign_SEEDBYTES = 32, + crypto_hash_BYTES = 64; + +nacl.lowlevel = { + crypto_core_hsalsa20: crypto_core_hsalsa20, + crypto_stream_xor: crypto_stream_xor, + crypto_stream: crypto_stream, + crypto_stream_salsa20_xor: crypto_stream_salsa20_xor, + crypto_stream_salsa20: crypto_stream_salsa20, + crypto_onetimeauth: crypto_onetimeauth, + crypto_onetimeauth_verify: crypto_onetimeauth_verify, + crypto_verify_16: crypto_verify_16, + crypto_verify_32: crypto_verify_32, + crypto_secretbox: crypto_secretbox, + crypto_secretbox_open: crypto_secretbox_open, + crypto_scalarmult: crypto_scalarmult, + crypto_scalarmult_base: crypto_scalarmult_base, + crypto_box_beforenm: crypto_box_beforenm, + crypto_box_afternm: crypto_box_afternm, + crypto_box: crypto_box, + crypto_box_open: crypto_box_open, + crypto_box_keypair: crypto_box_keypair, + crypto_hash: crypto_hash, + crypto_sign: crypto_sign, + crypto_sign_keypair: crypto_sign_keypair, + crypto_sign_open: crypto_sign_open, + + crypto_secretbox_KEYBYTES: crypto_secretbox_KEYBYTES, + crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES: crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES, + crypto_secretbox_ZEROBYTES: crypto_secretbox_ZEROBYTES, + crypto_secretbox_BOXZEROBYTES: crypto_secretbox_BOXZEROBYTES, + crypto_scalarmult_BYTES: crypto_scalarmult_BYTES, + crypto_scalarmult_SCALARBYTES: crypto_scalarmult_SCALARBYTES, + crypto_box_PUBLICKEYBYTES: crypto_box_PUBLICKEYBYTES, + crypto_box_SECRETKEYBYTES: crypto_box_SECRETKEYBYTES, + crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES: crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES, + crypto_box_NONCEBYTES: crypto_box_NONCEBYTES, + crypto_box_ZEROBYTES: crypto_box_ZEROBYTES, + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES: crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES, + crypto_sign_BYTES: crypto_sign_BYTES, + crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES: crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES, + crypto_sign_SECRETKEYBYTES: crypto_sign_SECRETKEYBYTES, + crypto_sign_SEEDBYTES: crypto_sign_SEEDBYTES, + crypto_hash_BYTES: crypto_hash_BYTES, + + gf: gf, + D: D, + L: L, + pack25519: pack25519, + unpack25519: unpack25519, + M: M, + A: A, + S: S, + Z: Z, + pow2523: pow2523, + add: add, + set25519: set25519, + modL: modL, + scalarmult: scalarmult, + scalarbase: scalarbase, +}; + +/* High-level API */ + +function checkLengths(k, n) { + if (k.length !== crypto_secretbox_KEYBYTES) throw new Error('bad key size'); + if (n.length !== crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES) throw new Error('bad nonce size'); +} + +function checkBoxLengths(pk, sk) { + if (pk.length !== crypto_box_PUBLICKEYBYTES) throw new Error('bad public key size'); + if (sk.length !== crypto_box_SECRETKEYBYTES) throw new Error('bad secret key size'); +} + +function checkArrayTypes() { + for (var i = 0; i < arguments.length; i++) { + if (!(arguments[i] instanceof Uint8Array)) + throw new TypeError('unexpected type, use Uint8Array'); + } +} + +function cleanup(arr) { + for (var i = 0; i < arr.length; i++) arr[i] = 0; +} + +nacl.randomBytes = function(n) { + var b = new Uint8Array(n); + randombytes(b, n); + return b; +}; + +nacl.secretbox = function(msg, nonce, key) { + checkArrayTypes(msg, nonce, key); + checkLengths(key, nonce); + var m = new Uint8Array(crypto_secretbox_ZEROBYTES + msg.length); + var c = new Uint8Array(m.length); + for (var i = 0; i < msg.length; i++) m[i+crypto_secretbox_ZEROBYTES] = msg[i]; + crypto_secretbox(c, m, m.length, nonce, key); + return c.subarray(crypto_secretbox_BOXZEROBYTES); +}; + +nacl.secretbox.open = function(box, nonce, key) { + checkArrayTypes(box, nonce, key); + checkLengths(key, nonce); + var c = new Uint8Array(crypto_secretbox_BOXZEROBYTES + box.length); + var m = new Uint8Array(c.length); + for (var i = 0; i < box.length; i++) c[i+crypto_secretbox_BOXZEROBYTES] = box[i]; + if (c.length < 32) return null; + if (crypto_secretbox_open(m, c, c.length, nonce, key) !== 0) return null; + return m.subarray(crypto_secretbox_ZEROBYTES); +}; + +nacl.secretbox.keyLength = crypto_secretbox_KEYBYTES; +nacl.secretbox.nonceLength = crypto_secretbox_NONCEBYTES; +nacl.secretbox.overheadLength = crypto_secretbox_BOXZEROBYTES; + +nacl.scalarMult = function(n, p) { + checkArrayTypes(n, p); + if (n.length !== crypto_scalarmult_SCALARBYTES) throw new Error('bad n size'); + if (p.length !== crypto_scalarmult_BYTES) throw new Error('bad p size'); + var q = new Uint8Array(crypto_scalarmult_BYTES); + crypto_scalarmult(q, n, p); + return q; +}; + +nacl.scalarMult.base = function(n) { + checkArrayTypes(n); + if (n.length !== crypto_scalarmult_SCALARBYTES) throw new Error('bad n size'); + var q = new Uint8Array(crypto_scalarmult_BYTES); + crypto_scalarmult_base(q, n); + return q; +}; + +nacl.scalarMult.scalarLength = crypto_scalarmult_SCALARBYTES; +nacl.scalarMult.groupElementLength = crypto_scalarmult_BYTES; + +nacl.box = function(msg, nonce, publicKey, secretKey) { + var k = nacl.box.before(publicKey, secretKey); + return nacl.secretbox(msg, nonce, k); +}; + +nacl.box.before = function(publicKey, secretKey) { + checkArrayTypes(publicKey, secretKey); + checkBoxLengths(publicKey, secretKey); + var k = new Uint8Array(crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES); + crypto_box_beforenm(k, publicKey, secretKey); + return k; +}; + +nacl.box.after = nacl.secretbox; + +nacl.box.open = function(msg, nonce, publicKey, secretKey) { + var k = nacl.box.before(publicKey, secretKey); + return nacl.secretbox.open(msg, nonce, k); +}; + +nacl.box.open.after = nacl.secretbox.open; + +nacl.box.keyPair = function() { + var pk = new Uint8Array(crypto_box_PUBLICKEYBYTES); + var sk = new Uint8Array(crypto_box_SECRETKEYBYTES); + crypto_box_keypair(pk, sk); + return {publicKey: pk, secretKey: sk}; +}; + +nacl.box.keyPair.fromSecretKey = function(secretKey) { + checkArrayTypes(secretKey); + if (secretKey.length !== crypto_box_SECRETKEYBYTES) + throw new Error('bad secret key size'); + var pk = new Uint8Array(crypto_box_PUBLICKEYBYTES); + crypto_scalarmult_base(pk, secretKey); + return {publicKey: pk, secretKey: new Uint8Array(secretKey)}; +}; + +nacl.box.publicKeyLength = crypto_box_PUBLICKEYBYTES; +nacl.box.secretKeyLength = crypto_box_SECRETKEYBYTES; +nacl.box.sharedKeyLength = crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES; +nacl.box.nonceLength = crypto_box_NONCEBYTES; +nacl.box.overheadLength = nacl.secretbox.overheadLength; + +nacl.sign = function(msg, secretKey) { + checkArrayTypes(msg, secretKey); + if (secretKey.length !== crypto_sign_SECRETKEYBYTES) + throw new Error('bad secret key size'); + var signedMsg = new Uint8Array(crypto_sign_BYTES+msg.length); + crypto_sign(signedMsg, msg, msg.length, secretKey); + return signedMsg; +}; + +nacl.sign.open = function(signedMsg, publicKey) { + checkArrayTypes(signedMsg, publicKey); + if (publicKey.length !== crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES) + throw new Error('bad public key size'); + var tmp = new Uint8Array(signedMsg.length); + var mlen = crypto_sign_open(tmp, signedMsg, signedMsg.length, publicKey); + if (mlen < 0) return null; + var m = new Uint8Array(mlen); + for (var i = 0; i < m.length; i++) m[i] = tmp[i]; + return m; +}; + +nacl.sign.detached = function(msg, secretKey) { + var signedMsg = nacl.sign(msg, secretKey); + var sig = new Uint8Array(crypto_sign_BYTES); + for (var i = 0; i < sig.length; i++) sig[i] = signedMsg[i]; + return sig; +}; + +nacl.sign.detached.verify = function(msg, sig, publicKey) { + checkArrayTypes(msg, sig, publicKey); + if (sig.length !== crypto_sign_BYTES) + throw new Error('bad signature size'); + if (publicKey.length !== crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES) + throw new Error('bad public key size'); + var sm = new Uint8Array(crypto_sign_BYTES + msg.length); + var m = new Uint8Array(crypto_sign_BYTES + msg.length); + var i; + for (i = 0; i < crypto_sign_BYTES; i++) sm[i] = sig[i]; + for (i = 0; i < msg.length; i++) sm[i+crypto_sign_BYTES] = msg[i]; + return (crypto_sign_open(m, sm, sm.length, publicKey) >= 0); +}; + +nacl.sign.keyPair = function() { + var pk = new Uint8Array(crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES); + var sk = new Uint8Array(crypto_sign_SECRETKEYBYTES); + crypto_sign_keypair(pk, sk); + return {publicKey: pk, secretKey: sk}; +}; + +nacl.sign.keyPair.fromSecretKey = function(secretKey) { + checkArrayTypes(secretKey); + if (secretKey.length !== crypto_sign_SECRETKEYBYTES) + throw new Error('bad secret key size'); + var pk = new Uint8Array(crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES); + for (var i = 0; i < pk.length; i++) pk[i] = secretKey[32+i]; + return {publicKey: pk, secretKey: new Uint8Array(secretKey)}; +}; + +nacl.sign.keyPair.fromSeed = function(seed) { + checkArrayTypes(seed); + if (seed.length !== crypto_sign_SEEDBYTES) + throw new Error('bad seed size'); + var pk = new Uint8Array(crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES); + var sk = new Uint8Array(crypto_sign_SECRETKEYBYTES); + for (var i = 0; i < 32; i++) sk[i] = seed[i]; + crypto_sign_keypair(pk, sk, true); + return {publicKey: pk, secretKey: sk}; +}; + +nacl.sign.publicKeyLength = crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES; +nacl.sign.secretKeyLength = crypto_sign_SECRETKEYBYTES; +nacl.sign.seedLength = crypto_sign_SEEDBYTES; +nacl.sign.signatureLength = crypto_sign_BYTES; + +nacl.hash = function(msg) { + checkArrayTypes(msg); + var h = new Uint8Array(crypto_hash_BYTES); + crypto_hash(h, msg, msg.length); + return h; +}; + +nacl.hash.hashLength = crypto_hash_BYTES; + +nacl.verify = function(x, y) { + checkArrayTypes(x, y); + // Zero length arguments are considered not equal. + if (x.length === 0 || y.length === 0) return false; + if (x.length !== y.length) return false; + return (vn(x, 0, y, 0, x.length) === 0) ? true : false; +}; + +nacl.setPRNG = function(fn) { + randombytes = fn; +}; + +(function() { + // Initialize PRNG if environment provides CSPRNG. + // If not, methods calling randombytes will throw. + var crypto = typeof self !== 'undefined' ? (self.crypto || self.msCrypto) : null; + if (crypto && crypto.getRandomValues) { + // Browsers. + var QUOTA = 65536; + nacl.setPRNG(function(x, n) { + var i, v = new Uint8Array(n); + for (i = 0; i < n; i += QUOTA) { + crypto.getRandomValues(v.subarray(i, i + Math.min(n - i, QUOTA))); + } + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) x[i] = v[i]; + cleanup(v); + }); + } else if (typeof require !== 'undefined') { + // Node.js. + crypto = require('crypto'); + if (crypto && crypto.randomBytes) { + nacl.setPRNG(function(x, n) { + var i, v = crypto.randomBytes(n); + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) x[i] = v[i]; + cleanup(v); + }); + } + } +})(); + +})(typeof module !== 'undefined' && module.exports ? module.exports : (self.nacl = self.nacl || {})); diff --git a/libs/tweetnacl/jex.eterms b/libs/tweetnacl/jex.eterms new file mode 100644 index 0000000..560a12c --- /dev/null +++ b/libs/tweetnacl/jex.eterms @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +{type, external}. +{realm, local}. +{name, tweetnacl}. +{version, "1.0.3"}. +{deps, []}. diff --git a/libs/tweetnacl/tsconfig.json b/libs/tweetnacl/tsconfig.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c870354 --- /dev/null +++ b/libs/tweetnacl/tsconfig.json @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +{"compilerOptions" : {"target" : "es2022", + "strict" : true, + "esModuleInterop" : true, + "skipLibCheck" : true, + "forceConsistentCasingInFileNames" : true, + "noImplicitAny" : true, + "strictNullChecks" : true, + "strictPropertyInitialization" : true, + "sourceMap" : true, + "outDir" : "dist", + "declaration" : true}, + "$schema" : "https://json.schemastore.org/tsconfig", + "display" : "Recommended", + "include" : ["src/**/*"], + "exclude" : ["src/jx_include"], + "composite" : true} diff --git a/utils/jex/priv/MANUAL.txt b/utils/jex/priv/MANUAL.txt index e6440fb..028a3dd 100644 --- a/utils/jex/priv/MANUAL.txt +++ b/utils/jex/priv/MANUAL.txt @@ -1,267 +1,60 @@ -===================================================================== -tl;dr -===================================================================== +INTRODUCTION + Jex is a simple packaging/dependency system for TypeScript/JavaScript + projects. -You can get this by running jex --help + As of now, Jex is a glorified shell script that automates a lot of the + tedium in building sidekick, JR, etc. Jex is very much a work in progress, + so these instructions are subject to change. -COMMANDS: - man show the manual - dwim- init, pull, build - dwim+ init, pull, build, mindist, push - cfgbarf barf out the jex.eterms file (mostly to make sure it parses correctly) - echo home echo $HOME - echo jexdir echo $HOME/.jex - echo devdir echo $HOME/.jex/dev - echo pkgname name of current package - echo pkgdir echo $HOME/.jex/dev/realm-name-X.Y.Z - echo deps list dependencies of current package - echo pathof PKG list the path to PKG or - init mkdir -p $HOME/.jex/dev - build tsc && cp -r ./src/jex_include ./dist/ - -w, --weak continue building even if tsc fails - -f, --force use cp -rf instead of cp -r - mindist mkdir jex_mindist && cp -r src jex_mindist && cp -r dist jex_mindist && rm -r jex_mindist/src/jex_include - -f, --force use cp -rf instead of cp -r - push rsync -a jex_mindist/ PKGDIR - ls ls $HOME/.jex/dev - tree tree $HOME/.jex/ - rmpkg PKG rm -r $HOME/.jex/dev/PKG - pull pull each dependency into src/jx_include + Jex is currently hyper-specialized to our use cases inside of Vanillae, and + is probably (currently) unsuitable for your use case. For instance, Jex + assumes you are running a UNIX-like system with standard UNIX programs + installed (e.g. tree, rsync, tar, etc). It also makes very strong + assumptions about your project structure and how you want to distribute + your project. + Our long-term goal is to build Jex out into a proper secure packaging + system, and completely remove any dependency on NPM. NPM comes with a lot + of unfixable security issues that present an unacceptable risk in a + business context. Developing software for the business context is the + focus of the Vanillae project. -===================================================================== -JEX MANUAL -===================================================================== +jex.eterms CONFIG FILE + Every project requires a file called `jex.eterms` in the root of the + project. -Jex is a simple packaging/dependency system for TypeScript/JavaScript -projects. + The config file is a list of Erlang terms separated by `.`s -As of now, Jex is a glorified shell script that automates a lot of -the tedium in building sidekick, JR, etc. Jex is very much a work in -progress, so these instructions are subject to change. + The following keys must exist, the rest are ignored -Jex is currently hyper-specialized to our use cases inside of -Vanillae, and is probably (currently) unsuitable for your use case. -For instance, Jex assumes you are running a UNIX-like system with -standard UNIX programs installed (e.g. tree, rsync, tar, etc). It -also makes very strong assumptions about your project structure and -how you want to distribute your project. + {type, library | external | extension}. + This key implies other settings in the build process -Our long-term goal is to build Jex out into a proper secure packaging -system, and completely remove any dependency on NPM. NPM comes with -a lot of unfixable security issues that present an unacceptable risk -in a business context. Developing software for the business context -is the focus of the Vanillae project. + library -> + The standard option. Pulls in dependencies and builds them, + assuming normal project layout. This is what you want in most + cases, even for things that are not libraries. -You'll see how it works and what the philosophy is if you keep -reading. + external -> + This is for external pre-built packages that we didn't develop, + such as TweetNaCl. This does not run `tsc`, etc. Jex assumes + the project has already been built, and so "install" etc just + copies stuff. + extension -> + Used for Jack Russell. Extensions have a much more complicated + build process because there are three different execution + contexts with three different constraint sets. -===================================================================== -HOW IT WORKS -===================================================================== + {realm, atom()}. + {name, atom()}. + {version, string()}. + {deps, [string()]}. -To start off, we run `jex init` +PROJECT STRUCTURE + Jex makes very strong assumptions about your project structure - [~] % jex init - $ mkdir -p /home/pharpend/.jex/dev - -As I said above, jex is currently a glorified shell script. Much like -`make`, jex prints the command it's running with a `$` at the -beginning of the line. - -We can get a sense of what will go in this directory by running `jex -tree` (yours will not look like this): - - [~] % jex tree - $ tree /home/pharpend/.jex - /home/pharpend/.jex - └── dev - ├── local-awcp-0.1.0 - │   ├── dist - │   │   ├── awcp.d.ts - │   │   ├── awcp.js - │   │   ├── awcp.js.map - │   │   └── jex_include - │   └── src - │   └── awcp.ts - ├── local-parasite-0.1.0 - │   ├── dist - │   │   ├── ae_compiler.d.ts - │   │   ├── ae_compiler.js - │   │   ├── ae_compiler.js.map - │   │   ├── ae_node.d.ts - │   │   ├── ae_node.js - │   │   ├── ae_node.js.map - │   │   ├── jex_include - │   │   ├── net.d.ts - │   │   ├── net.js - │   │   └── net.js.map - │   └── src - │   ├── ae_compiler.ts - │   ├── ae_node.ts - │   └── net.ts - └── local-sidekick-0.1.0 - ├── dist - │   ├── jex_include - │   │   └── local-awcp-0.1.0 - │   │   ├── dist - │   │   │   ├── awcp.d.ts - │   │   │   ├── awcp.js - │   │   │   ├── awcp.js.map - │   │   │   └── jex_include - │   │   └── src - │   │   └── awcp.ts - │   ├── sidekick.d.ts - │   ├── sidekick.js - │   └── sidekick.js.map - └── src - └── sidekick.ts - - 17 directories, 24 files - -Currently, Jex is managing 3 packages for me: - -1. awcp -2. parasite -3. sidekick - -In a secure context, we want to avoid opaque rewrites whenever -possible. This rules out bundling or minifying tools such as -browserify. We want the code that is running in the user's browser -to be human-readable and to have a straightforward mapping to -the original source. - -Let's start with the simplest package which is `awcp`. This is the -source directory listing - - [v/libs pharpend/develop] % tree awcp - awcp - ├── dist - │   ├── awcp.d.ts - │   ├── awcp.js - │   ├── awcp.js.map - │   └── jex_include - ├── erl_crash.dump - ├── jex.eterms - ├── jex_mindist - │   ├── dist - │   │   ├── awcp.d.ts - │   │   ├── awcp.js - │   │   ├── awcp.js.map - │   │   └── jex_include - │   └── src - │   └── awcp.ts - ├── LICENSE - ├── Makefile - ├── README.md - ├── src - │   ├── awcp.ts - │   └── jex_include - └── tsconfig.json - - 8 directories, 14 files - -There is only one source file: `/src/awcp.ts`. There is a directory -called `/src/jex_include/` which is empty. If awcp had dependencies, -this is where they would go. - -The file tree that ends up in `~/.jex/dev` is the `jex_mindist` -directory. Let's focus on that - - [v/libs pharpend/develop] % tree awcp/jex_mindist - awcp/jex_mindist - ├── dist - │   ├── awcp.d.ts - │   ├── awcp.js - │   ├── awcp.js.map - │   └── jex_include - └── src - └── awcp.ts - - 3 directories, 4 files - -As you can see, it's the same tree - - [v/libs pharpend/develop] % tree ~/.jex/dev/local-awcp-0.1.0 - /home/pharpend/.jex/dev/local-awcp-0.1.0 - ├── dist - │   ├── awcp.d.ts - │   ├── awcp.js - │   ├── awcp.js.map - │   └── jex_include - └── src - └── awcp.ts - - 3 directories, 4 files - -Briefly, jex is built around the assumptions that you want simplicity, -transparency, and composability, possibly at the expense of some -duplication. - -It's assumed that you are developing JS to execute in the context of -a website, that you are writing only a small amount of JS (i.e. NOT -framework JS or a single-page-application), and that serving a -JavaScript file tree does not present a bandwidth issue. Everything -has a version number, so that you can properly take advantage of -caching. - -The idea is that you want to be able to take that file tree above, -make it into a tarball, drop it on your server, and have it "just -work". Or, you can drop the whole tree into your existing project -and have it "just work". We want the source map to work properly, so -the TypeScript source is included in the bundle. - -For more context, let's switch over to the Sidekick project. Sidekick -depends on AWCP. - - [src/v pharpend/develop] % tree sidekick/src - sidekick/src - ├── jex_include - │   └── local-awcp-0.1.0 - │   ├── dist - │   │   ├── awcp.d.ts - │   │   ├── awcp.js - │   │   ├── awcp.js.map - │   │   └── jex_include - │   └── src - │   └── awcp.ts - └── sidekick.ts - - 5 directories, 5 files - -Jex automates the process of pulling awcp from the local repository -and including it in a predictable file path in the source tree. - -To import AWCP, `sidekick.ts` contains this line - - import * as awcp from './jex_include/local-awcp-0.1.0/dist/awcp.js'; - -Notice that we're importing the JS file, not the TS file. TypeScript -gets its type information from the `dist/awcp.d.ts` file, not from -the `src/awcp.ts` file. The `src/awcp.ts` file is only included so -the source map works properly in the browser's debugger. - -The next step is to compile sidekick. To do this, we run `jex dwim-`. -This is shorthand for `jex init && jex pull && jex build` - - dwim(minus) -> - % make the ~/.jex/dev directory - init(), - % pull the dependencies into src/jex_include - pull(), - % run tsc - build([]); - dwim(plus) -> - dwim(minus), - % make the jex_mindist folder - mindist([]), - % push to local repo - push(). - -This is the essential flow of using Jex. Suppose we update AWCP and -want to see that result reflected in sidekick. - -1. In the AWCP repository, we run `jex dwim+`. This makes a new - distribution tarball and pushes it to the local repository. -2. In the sidekick repository, we run `jex dwim-`. This pulls the new + README.md used by documentation tool `typedoc` + jex.eterms explained above + tsconfig.json needed for tsc + src/ typescript source code diff --git a/utils/jex/src/jex.erl b/utils/jex/src/jex.erl index 48fab47..998d3b7 100644 --- a/utils/jex/src/jex.erl +++ b/utils/jex/src/jex.erl @@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ help() -> % TODONE: jex get_mindist PKG % TODONE: jex dwim++ = install +% TODO: jex directory based on version +% TODO: "external" install +% - pull only on library + % TODO: use less than full qualified names (not priority) % TODO: --name option for docs (not priority) % TODO: make fulldist for arbitrary installed package (requires storing jex.eterms, not hard but also not a priority) @@ -183,11 +187,45 @@ dwim(plus_plus) -> %%----------------------------------------------------------------------------- cfgbarf() -> - tell(info, "~tp~n", [file:consult("jex.eterms")]). - + tell(info, "~tp~n", [cfg(unsafe)]). cfg() -> - file:consult("jex.eterms"). + cfg(safe). + + + +-spec cfg(MaybeSafe) -> Result + when MaybeSafe :: safe | unsafe + Result :: {ok, Cfg :: proplist()} + | {error, Reason :: term()}. +% @doc "safe" means it checks to make sure the + +cfg(unsafe) -> + {ok, Terms} = file:consult("jex.eterms"); + Terms; +cfg(safe) -> + case file:consult("jex.eterms") of + {ok, Terms} -> cfg2(Terms); + Error -> Error + end. + +cfg2(Cfg) -> + % allowed values: + % - library + % - external + % - extension + case proplists:get_value(type, Cfg) of + % allowed values + library -> {ok, Cfg}; + external -> {ok, Cfg}; + extension -> {ok, Cfg}; + % no key + undefined -> {error, {no_key, type}}; + % bad value + BadType -> {error, {bad_type, BadType}} + end. + + %%----------------------------------------------------------------------------- %% jex echo